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Abstract 
Certificateless signature can effectively immue the key escrow problem in the identity-based 
signature scheme. But the security of the most certificateless signatures usually depends on only one 
mathematical hard problem, which makes the signature vulnerable when the underlying hard problem has 
been broken. In order to strengthen the security, in this paper, a certificateless signature whose security 
depends on two mathematical hard problems, discrete logarithm and factoring problems, is proposed. 
Then, the proposed certificateless signature can be proved secure in the random oracle, and only both of 
the two mathematical hard problems are solved, can the proposed signature be broken. As a 
consequence, the proposed certificateless signature is more secure than the previous signatures. On the 
other hand, with the pre-computation of the exponential modular computation, it will save more time in the 
signature signing phase. And compared with the other schemes of this kind, the proposed scheme is more 
efficient. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1984, Shamir first introduced the concept of identity-based public key cryptosystem 
(ID-PKC) [1], which was used to solve the certificate management problem in traditional public 
key cryptosystem. In the ID-PKC, the Key Generator Centre (KGC) generates a private key for 
the accepted user who registers in the KGC with his/her identity, while the user’s identity is 
taken as the corresponding public key. For example, the user’s name or email can be used as 
his/her public key, so the system doesn’t need any public key certificate. Therefore, it can 
efficiently solve the certificate management problem suffered by the traditional public key 
cryptosystem. But, in the ID-PKC, all the users must trust the KGC, since he/she masters all the 
users’ secret keys. In fact, in the internet, none of the participants can be fully trusted. This 
means that the malicious KGC can forge any user’s signature, since he/she knows all the 
private keys of the registed users.  
In order to solve the key escrow problem existing in ID-PKC, in 2003, the certificateless 
public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) was presented [2]. In the CL-PKC, a user’s private key 
consists of two parts, secret value and partial private key. The secret value is master by the 
user, while the partial private key is shared by both the user and KGC. Then, ID-PKC can avoid 
KGC having access to a user’s private key, so the key escrow problem existing in the ID-PKC 
can be ingeniously solved. This means that certificateless signature can effectively immue the 
key escrow problem existing in the ID-based signature. Then, based on the idea in [2], many 
certificateless signature schemes (CLS) were proposed. Some of the early CLSschemes were 
not secure. For example, all the schemes proposed in [2-5] were insecure against type I 
adversary [6].  Because bilinear pairings have good cryptographic properties, some CLS 
schemes based bilinear pairings were proposed [7-12], also. These pairing-based schemes 
have been proved to be secure in the formal security model. However, in these pairing-based 
schemes, heavy pairing operations were required. According to the result in [13], one pairing 
operation was about 11110 multiplications in finite field F3
163
. In 2011, He et al. presented a CLS 
scheme without bilinear pairings [14]. Generally, it is believed that the efficiency of CLS without 
pairings will be more efficient than those paring-based schemes. To improve the efficiency of 
CLS, a number of CLS schemes without pairings were proposed [15-17]. Unfortunately, these 
                     ISSN: 1693-6930 
TELKOMNIKA  Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2016 :  335 – 341 
336 
schemes were vulnerable to type II adversary [18, 19]. Recently, Yeh et al. [20] presented a 
CLS scheme without pairings, and claimed that their scheme was efficient and practical for 
mobile communication. Nevertheless, in their security proof, the discrete logarithm value x of the 
given discrete logarithm instance was not derived. Hence, the security proof of his scheme is 
not sufficient. How to construct a secure and efficient CLS without pairings is still an open 
problem. On the other hand, different from the constructions of all the CLS schemes discussed 
above, the CLS proposed in [21] is a classical one based on RSA [22]. 
It should be noted that the security of all the CLS schemes discussed above is based 
on only one security problem: discrete logarithm problem, or computing Diffie-Hellman problem, 
or factoring problem. In this paper, we will present a CLS scheme based on discrete logarithm 
and factoring problems. That is, only both the two mathematical hard problems are solved can 
the proposed CLS scheme be broken. We will prove the security of the proposed scheme under 
formal security model. Compared with the scheme proposed in [21] whose security depends on 
only one hard problem, the proposed scheme has a better security. Compared with the scheme 
proposed in [23], the proposed scheme is a certificateless one, which doesn’t need any 
certificate, and it doesn’t need to send any public key certificate to the verifier before verifying a 
signature. On the other hand, with the pre-computation of exponential modular computation, it 
will save more time in the signature signing phase. Meanwhile, in the signature verification 
phase, it only needs two exponential operations. In concequence, the proposed CLS scheme is 
more efficient than similar kinds of schemes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose our new 
certificateless scheme. In section 3, the security analysis of the proposed scheme is discussed. 
In section 4, the efficiency and security comparison between the proposed scheme and the 
other schemes of this kind is analyzed. At last, in section 5, we conclude. 
 
 
2. The Certificateless Signature Scheme  
2.1 Complexity assumptions 
Definition 1(Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Let N=pq be a RSA modular number 
satisfying p=2p′+1, q=2q′+1. g∈ZN* is a generator of G by order p′q′. Given the parameters g, y, 
N, the discrete logarithm problem is to compute the exponent x such that y=g
x
mod N. 
Throughout this paper, we assume it is hard to solve DLP. 
Definition 2 (Factoring Problem (FP)).Let N=pq, where p and q are two large primes 
with security parameter λ. It is hard to factor N into p and q. 
 
2.2 Our new certificateless signature scheme 
Setup: Let p and q be two large primes, where p=2p′+1, q=2q′+1, and p′ and q′ are both 
large primes, too. N=p·q is the modular number. Assume it is hard to factor N. On the other 
hand, H:{0, 1}*→ZQ and  H1:{0, 1}*×{0, 1}*→ZN  are two secure hash functions, where ZQ is the 
set of quadratic residue under modular N. 
Partial private key extract: Given the user’s identity ID, KGC calculates h=H(ID)mod N 
and SID=
h mod N. Note that the square root SID of h can be computed by Rabin algorithm 
[24]. Next, KGC returns the partial private key SID to the user. 
Set private key: The user randomly chooses his/her secret value x∈ZN, and adopts the 
pair (SID, x) as his/her private key. 
Set public key: Given identity ID and the secret value x, the user computes y=h
x
mod N 
as his/her own public key, where h=H(ID). 
Sign: Given a message m,the user chooses a random number k∈ZN and compute 
 
r=(SID)
k 
mod N, l=H1(m, r) and t=k+xl.   (1) 
 
The signature on the message m is σ=(t, r, y). 
Verify: Given the message m and the signature σ=(t, r, y), the verifier computes 
 
h=H(ID) and l=H1(m, r). Then, he/she verifies whether the equation 
 
h
t
=r
2
y
l 
mod N  (2) 
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holds. If it holds, the verifier accepts the signature, or he/she refuses. 
The correctness of the proposed scheme is given below. 
2
2
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mod ( mod )
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3. Security Analysis 
In general, for a certificateless signature, two kinds of adversaries with different 
capabilities need to be considered [2]. Type I adversary acts as a dishonest user, who can 
replace any entity’s public key with unique value, but he/she does not know the master secret 
key of KGC. Type II adversary acts a malicious KGC, who has an opposite capability that 
he/she knows the master secret key of KGC but cannot replace any entity’s public key. In 
addition, in [3], Type I and Type II adversaries are also classified into three categories: normal, 
strong and super levels. These three categories of adversaries have different capabilities.  
Normal: The normal-level Type I (or II) adversary has access to the valid signatures.  
Strong: The strong-level Type I (or II) adversary can replace the public key of legal 
users, then forge a valid signature when the adversary possesses a corresponding secret value.  
Super: The super-level Type I (or II) adversary has the ability to learn valid signatures 
for a replaced public key without any submission. In this paper, we take the super-level 
adversary into consideration in our security analysis. 
By the discrete logarithm and factoring assumptions, we can prove that our signature is 
secure against the super-level Type I adversary and Type II adversary. Before presenting the 
security poof of the proposed scheme, we first review the forking lemma [25]. 
Lemma 1. [Forking Lemma]
[25]
 In the random oracle mode, for a generic signature 
scheme, let F be a Turing machine whose input only consists of public data. Assume that F can 
produce a valid signature (m, σ1, h, σ2) within a time bound T by un-negligible probability 
ε≥10(ns+1)(nh+ns)/q, where nh and ns are the numbers of queries that F can ask to the random 
oracle and the signing oracle respectively. If the triple (σ1, h, σ2) can be simulated without 
knowing the secret key, with an indistinguishable distribution probability, then there is another 
machine which has control over the machine obtained from F replacing the signing oracle by 
simulation and produces two valid signatures (m, σ1, h, σ2) and (m, σ1, h′, 2

) such that h≠h′ in 
the expected time less than 120686·nh·T/ε. 
Theorem 1. In the random oracle mode, for our CLS scheme, let Type I adversary have 
a polynomial-time algorithm α that can produce a valid signature (t, r, y) such that h
t
=r
2
y
l
mod N 
within a time bound T by un-negligible probability ε≥10(ns+1)(nh+ns)/q, where nh is the number of 
queries that α can ask to the random oracle  H1, and ns is the number of queries that α can ask 
to the signing oracle. If the signature (t, r, y) can be simulated without knowing the private key, 
with an indistinguishable distribution probability, then there is another machine which can solve 
the Discrete Logarithm Problem and Factoring Problem in the expected time less than 
120686·nh·T/ε. 
Proof. Suppose Type I Adversary has a polynomial-time algorithm α that can break the 
proposed scheme with non-negligible advantage ε, and H, H1 are two random oracles. Let β be 
the challenger.  
In the initialization phase, the system setups the public parameters, the modular 
number N, the public key y, and the hash function H and H1, all of which are the same as those 
described in section 2. Now, β’s goal is to solve both hard problems: discrete logarithm problem 
and factoring problem. He/she tries to compute out discrete logarithm of y to the base h and to 
factor the RSA modular N into prime numbers p and q. 
In the Query phase, the following oracle queries are adaptively issued by α, and each 
query is unique. 
H Query: Upon receiving an H query for the identity IDi from α, β checks the list listH 
maintained by himself/herself, and returns hi to α. The detailed steps are as follows. 
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If ( iID
S
, hi, IDi) already exists in the list listH, β directly returns hi to α. Otherwise, β 
randomly chooses iID
S
∈ZN , computes hi=
2 mod
iID
S N
 and sets H(IDi):= hi. Then, he/she returns 
hi to α. After that, the triple ( i
IDS , hi,IDi) is added into the list listH. 
H1 Query: Upon receiving a H1 query for the pair (m, ri) from α, β checks the list 1
listH  
maintained by himself/herself. Then he/she returns li to α. The detailed steps are as follows. 
If (li, m, ri) already exists in the list 1
listH , β directly returns li to α. Otherwise, β 
randomly chooses a number li∈ZN . Then, he/she sets H1(m, ri):= li and returns li to α. After that, 
β adds(li, m, ri) into the list 1
listH . 
Partial Private Key Extract Query: Upon receiving a query for the partial private key of 
the user with identity IDi, β executes the H Query, and returns i
IDS  to α. In this phase, Type I 
adversary cannot query the partial private key of the target user with identity ID. 
Private Key Query: Upon receiving a query for the private key of the user with identity 
IDi, β queries the Partial Private Key Extract Oracle and gets the partial private key i
IDS . Then, 
he/she randomly chooses a number xi∈ZN  and returns the pair ( i
IDS , xi ) to α. 
Public Key Query: Upon receiving a query for the public key of the user with identity 
IDi, β queries the random oracle H and Private Key Oracle. So, β can get ( i
IDS , hi, IDi,xi). Then, 
β computes yi=
modixih N  and returns yi to α. 
Public Key Replacement: Upon receiving a query for the public key of the user with 
identity IDi and public key yi′, β simulates the Public Key Query for the identity IDi and replace yi′ 
with yi. This replacement will be recorded by β. 
Signing Query: Upon receiving a signing query for a user′s identityIDi on some 
message m, β executes the Private Key Query to obtain the pair ( iID
S
, xi ) and hi. Then, he/she 
randomly chooses a number k∈ZNandcomputes ri=( i
IDS )kmodN. Next, β executes the algorithm 
H1 Query and obtains the triple (li, m, ri) from the 1
listH . So, he/she computes ti=k+xili. At last, β 
returns the signature σi=(ti, ri, yi) to α, where yi=
modixih N . It is easy to verify that σi can pass 
the signature verification. 
From the simulation, the challenger can successfully answer all the queries without 
being detected. Then, the algorithm α believes that he/she has successfully attacked the 
proposed scheme. Note that in forking lemma, l is the hash value of (m, r). And l only depends 
on m and r. Then, β can simulates another machine by using the forking lemma, and produces 
two valid signatures (t, r, y) and (t*, r, y) for the target user with identity ID and public key y. 
From equation (2), we have 
 
2 modt lh r y N
  (3) 
 
* 2 * modt lh r y N
, (4) 
whereh can be seemed as the identity of the garget user with identity ID and public key 
y. From the equation (1), (3) and (4), we can get  
 
t=k+xl,  (5) 
 
t
*
=k+xl
*
,  (6) 
wherel≠l*. Therefore, from equations (5) and (6), we can derive 
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*
*
t t
x
l l


 . 
Then, the discrete logarithm of y to the base h can be computed. On the other hand, 
from equations (3) and (4), we have 
 
2 mod t lr h y N
, (7) 
 
2 * * mod t lr h y N
, (8) 
 
Then, if all the numbers t
*
, t ,l
*
, l are even numbers, we can also get 
 
* * 22
2 2 2 2 2 mod
   
    
    
t l t l
r h y h y N
 (9) 
from equations (7) and (8). Therefore, we can factor the RSA modular N by computing  
 
* *
2 2 2 2gcd( , )
 

t l t l
h y h y N or
* *
2 2 2 2gcd( , )
 

t l t l
h y h y N  
 
From Theorem 1, it is easy to get Theorem 2 as follow.  
Theorem 2. The proposed certificateless signature scheme can achieve existential 
unforgeability against a super-level Type I adversary in the random oracle model. Only both of 
the discrete logarithm and factoring problems are solved can the proposed signature scheme be 
broken. 
Similarly, we have Theorem 3 as follow. 
Theorem 3. The proposed certificateless signature scheme can achieve existential 
unforgeability against a super-level Type II adversary in the random oracle model. Only both of 
the discrete logarithm and factoring problems are solved can the proposed signature scheme be 
broken. 
Proof. By using the proof similar to that of Theorem 2, we can prove that our CLS 
scheme can achieve existential unforgeability against a super-level Type II adversary. Note that 
Type II adversary acts as a malicious KGC. Hence, a super-level Type II adversary can query 
the partial private key of any user, including the target user. Then, the difference is that in 
theorem 3, the super-level Type II adversary cannot mount a public key replacement attack to 
the target user, since this kind of adversary can query the partial private key of the target user. 
 
 
4. Efficiency and Security Comparison 
In this part, we compare the proposed scheme with the similar schemes of this kind [21, 
23]. First, we make a security comparison among the similar schemes. The security of scheme 
proposed in [21] depends on only one hard problem. From the security proof in [21], we find the 
signature in [21] will be broken in case that either RSA problem or discrete logarithm problem is 
broken, while only both the two mathematical hard problems, discrete logarithm and factoring 
problems, are broken can the proposed signature can be forged. Then, compared with the 
scheme in [21], the proposed scheme has a better security. The security of the scheme 
proposed by Verma and Sharma [23] is also based on discrete logarithm and factoring 
problems. However, the security of their scheme cannot be proved in the formal security model.  
What is more, their scheme is a certificate-based one, in which the security of key management 
has to be considered. On the other hand, before verifying the signature in [23], the public key 
certificate should be transmitted to the verifier. 
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Table 1.Security Comparison of the Similar Schemes 
Schemes CLS Security level and underlying 
problem 
Formal security proof 
Scheme [21] Yes I level: RSA Problem or DLP Yes 
Scheme [23] No II level: DLP and FP No 
The proposed scheme Yes II level: DLP and FP Yes 
 
 
I level: The security of the signature depends on only one hard problem. 
II level: The security of the signature depends on two hard problems. Only both of the 
underlying hard problems are solved can the signature be broken.   
DLP: Discrete Logarithm Problem. 
FP: Factoring Problem. 
 
Now, we compare the efficiency of the similar schemes. In a signature scheme, 
compared with the other operations under modular, the exponential operation is more time-
consuming. So, for a signature scheme, the fewer exponential operations should be used.Then, 
we mainly compare the numbers of exponential operation and hash operation among the similar 
schemes. From the comparison in Table 2, it is found that the proposed scheme has the fewest 
exponential operations. Then, compared with the similar kinds of schemes, the proposed CLS 
scheme is more efficient. In fact, in the proposed scheme, the parameter r in the signing phase 
can be pre-computed and stored before signing a signature. Hence, the exponential operation in 
the signing phase of the proposed scheme can be ignored. This means that it will save much 
time to sign a signature, since it can reduce one or more exponential operations when the pre-
computation is ignored. 
 
 
Table 2.Efficiency Comparison of the Similar Schemes 
Schemes 
Signing phase Verification phase 
exponential operation hash operation exponential operation hash operation 
scheme[21] 3 1 4 2 
scheme [23] 2 1 4 1 
The proposed 
scheme 
1 1 2 2 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Due to the virtues of CLS, manycertificateless signatures have been proposed. 
However, the security of most CLS schemes depends on only mathematical hard problem. In 
this paper, we present a new CLS scheme, whose security depends on two complexity 
assumptions: DLP and FP. That is, only both DLP and FP are broken can our signature be 
forged. On the other hand, we show the proposed scheme has the fewest exponential 
operations during both signing phase and verifying phase. Therefore, compared with the others 
similar schemes, the proposed scheme is more secure and efficient.  
(1)  As shown in the Table 1, the proposed scheme is a CLS one, and it has II security 
level. And we present the formal security proof for the proposed scheme in the security model. 
Then, compared with the schemes in [22, 23], the proposed scheme is more secure.  
(2)  As shown in the Table 2, the proposed scheme has the fewest exponential 
operations during both the signing phase and verifying phase. Especially, with the pre-
computation of exponential modular computation, it will save much time in signature signing 
phase. Then, for the proposed scheme, it will be more efficient to sign and verify a signature. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
This work is supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 
61272525), the Foundation for Doctors of Zhengzhou University of Light Industry (NO. 
20080014) and the Fundamental and Advanced Technology Research Project of Henan 
province (Grant No. 152300410129). 
 
 
TELKOMNIKA  ISSN: 1693-6930  
Certificateless Signature Scheme Based on Rabin Algorithm … (Xiangjun Xin) 
341 
REFERENCES 
[1] Shamir A. Identity-based cryptosystem and signature schemes. Proceedings of CRYPTO’84, G.R. 
Blakley and D. Chaum (Eds.), Paris France. 1984; LNCS196: 47-53. 
[2] Al-Riyami S, Paterson KG. Certificateless public key cryptography. Proceedings of ASIA CRYPT 
2003, Chi-Sung Laih (Ed.), Taipei, Taiwan. 2003; LNCS 2894: 452-473. 
[3] Yum DH, Lee PJ. Generic construction of certificateless signature. Proceeding of 9
th
 Australasian 
Conference on Information Security and Privacy, Wang H., et al.(Eds.), Sydney, Australia. 2004; 
LNCS 3108: 200-211. 
[4] Huang X, Mu Y, Susilo W, Wong DS, Wu W. Certificateless signature revisited. Proceedings of 
ACISP 2007, Josef Pieprzyk, HosseinGhodosi, Ed Dawson (Eds.), Townsville, Australia. 2007; LNCS 
4586: 308-322. 
[5] Huang WS, Susilo W, Mu Y, Zhang F. On the security of certificateless signature schemes from 
Asiacrypt 2003. InCANS2005, Desmett Y. G., Wang H., Mu Y., Li Y.(Eds.), Shenzhen, China.2005; 
LNCS 3810: 13-25. 
[6] Hu BC, Wong DS, Zhang Z, Deng X. Key replacement attack against a generic construction of 
certificateless signature. Proceedings of ACISP, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 2006; 4058: 
235-246. 
[7] Li X, Chen K, Sun L. Certificateless signature and proxy signature schemes from bilinear pairings. 
Lithuanian Mathematical Journal. 2005; 45(1): 76-83. 
[8] Cheng L, Wen Q, Jin Z. Cryptanalysis and improvement of a certificateless aggregate signature 
scheme. Information Sciences. 2015; 295: 337-346. 
[9] Yuan Y, Wang C. Certificateless signature scheme with security enhanced in the standard model. 
Information Processing Letters. 2014; 114 (9): 492-499. 
[10]  Du H, Wen Q. Certificateless proxy multi-signature. Information Sciences. 2014; 276: 21-30. 
[11] Tso R, Yi X, Huang X. Efficient and short certificateless signatures secure against realistic 
adversaries. Journal of Supercomputing. 2011; 55: 173–191. 
[12] Horng S, Tzeng SF, Huang PH. An efficient certificateless aggregate signature with conditional 
privacy-preserving for vehicular sensor networks. Information Sciences. 2015; 317: 48-66. 
[13] Zhang F, Safavi-Naini R, Susilo W. An efficient signature scheme from bilinear pairings and its 
applications. In Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2004, Singapore. 2004;1: 277-290. 
[14] He D, Chen J, Zhang R. An efficient and provably-secure certificateless signature scheme without 
bilinear pairings. International Journal of Communication Systems. 2012, 25(11): 1432-1442. 
[15] He D, Chen J, Hu J. A pairing-free certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol. Int J 
Commun Syst. 2012; 25: 221-230. 
[16] Gong, Li P. Further improvement of a certificateless signature scheme without pairing. Int J Commun 
Syst. 2012; 10: 2450-2457. 
[17] Swati V, Birendra KS, A new proxy blind signature scheme based on DLP, International Journal of 
Information & Network Security. 2012; 1(2): 60-66. 
[18] Tian M, Huang L. Cryptanalysis of a certificateless signature scheme without pairings. International 
Journal of Communication Systems. 2013; 26(11): 1375-1381. 
[19] Tsai JL, Lo NW, Wu TC. Weaknesses and improvements of an efficient certificateless signature 
scheme without using bilinear pairings. International Journal of Communication Systems. 2014; 
27(7): 1083-1090. 
[20] Yeh KH, Tsai KY, Fan YC. An efficient certificateless signature scheme without bilinear pairings. 
Multimedia Tools and Applications. 2014; 10: 1007-1015. 
[21] Zhang JH, Mao J. An efficient RSA-based certificateless signature scheme. The Journal of Systems 
and Software. 2012; 85: 638-642.  
[22] Rivest TL, Shamir A, Adleman L. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public key 
cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM. 1978; 3: 120-126. 
[23] Verma S, Sharma BK. A new signature scheme based on factoring and discrete logarithm problems, 
International Journal of Information & Network Security. 2012;1(3): 158-162. 
[24] Rabin MO. Digitalized signatures and public key function as intractable as factoring. MIT/LCS/TR. 
1979; 5: 212-213. 
[25] Pointcheval D, Stern J. Security arguments for digital signatures and blind signatures. Journal of 
Cryptology. 2000; 13(3): 361−369. 
